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First Letter: D

Data Security

Written by Jerker Hellström on .

Brief

The rapid development of digital technologies has brought new challenges in protecting data from misuse, loss, or unauthorised access. In liberal democracies, data security is closely linked to the right to privacy, which is governed by laws that emphasise transparency and consent. While China has benefited greatly from the digital revolution in terms of economic growth and technological progress, the Party-state also sees significant threats. As the data-driven economy has prompted a reallocation of power from governments to data-powered firms, China’s approach to data security has become closely tied to its objectives of maintaining state control.

Chinese data-related laws emphasise data localisation and strict government oversight to strengthen national security while reducing reliance on foreign technology. The Cybersecurity Law of 2017, for example, requires government approval for transferring certain data overseas. Despite a series of new laws, foreign officials and legal experts remain concerned over a lack of clarity regarding rules for the cross-border transfer of data (CBTD). 

Analysis

In 2017, The Economist declared that data had become the world’s most valuable resource, surpassing oil. In the wake of the dotcom bubble Internet companies had harnessed vast quantities of data for advertising purposes, which was being leveraged to fuel the development of AI services, creating huge wealth and power, the magazine noted.

This shift was not lost on China’s Communist Party, which viewed data not just as a commodity, but since 2019 also designated “data” as a critical factor of production alongside land, labour, capital, and technology. The state had already begun investing heavily in “informatisation” (信息化) in the 1990s, part of a programme to build digital infrastructure, strengthen the domestic tech industry, and ensure national security. Data had become a strategic asset to advance national interests.

The Party-state’s efforts to control data have been codified and made more pronounced in recent years through a series of foundational laws. The Cybersecurity Law (2017) laid the groundwork by mandating network security and requiring data localisation for critical information infrastructure operators. This was followed by the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law, both enacted in 2021. This legislation enhances state control by ensuring government access to information, mandating security reviews for cross-border transfers of “important data,” and placing strict new obligations on private firms. A further tightening occurred in April 2023 when a revised anti-espionage law banned the transfer of any data related to “national security and interests”, broad and vague terms that severely restrict international firms’ ability to conduct due diligence.

This domestic strategy is also reflected in the nation’s efforts to shape the international conversation around data. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in 2020 announced the “Global Data Security Initiative” (全球数据安全倡议), a less known precursor to Xi Jinping’s other Global Initiatives. The GDSI implicitly addressed foreign concerns about over-reliance on Chinese communications technology, stressing the need for an “objective and rational attitude,” while defending domestic requirements for data localisation.

Domestically, the casting of data as a security issue has become increasingly pronounced in China’s legal framework. Data security was formally added to a list of twenty key categories in Xi’s “Comprehensive National Security” concept in 2025, underscoring that data is now officially viewed as being on par with political, military, and economic security. This shift reflects Beijing’s concern that foreign access to data could undermine its governance and economic stability. This national security-centric approach has become a significant point of friction with Europe, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen calling the Chinese provisions “excessive” and expressing concern about the lack of clarity in China’s data security regulations.

As more of China’s partners in the Global South turn to communications technology and connected devices from Chinese firms, some of the data security concerns raised in the Western hemisphere are also heard in these countries. In 2018, for example, French newspaper Le Monde reported that China had installed listening devices in the African Union’s headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Thus far, however, Chinese tech is mainly hailed in Global South countries for being relatively affordable and user-friendly. For example, the proliferation in Africa and Latin America of Chinese 4G network gear and “Safe City” digital surveillance programmes is rarely openly contested in these regions. 

Democracy

Written by Katja Drinhausen on .

Brief

In the PRC, democracy refers to the Marxist-Leninist system of democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism, in which the CCP is the ultimate representative of the people. This “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics” is explicitly distinguished from liberal democracy, which is seen as incompatible with China’s unique conditions. While citizens in China can vote for their local representatives, the CCP is constitutionally defined as the sole ruling party and has guiding power over all legislative and state organs.

Despite the lack of a multi-party system, in which access to power is based on periodic elections by universal suffrage, the Party defines itself as inherently democratic. Through “consultative democracy” (协商民主), the CCP formally incorporates the interests of various social groups. Legitimacy is mainly derived from ensuring order, prosperity, and security. Emboldened by successes in delivering economic growth, public health and welfare, the Party increasingly presents this as the superior model internationally. As Xi Jinping stated in 2017: “China’s socialist democracy is the most comprehensive, genuine and effective democracy.”

Analysis

Rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, the term “democracy” (民主) has been deeply embedded in Party language since the founding of the CCP, reflected in the original mission to build a “people’s democracy”. In 2019, Xi coined the term “whole-process democracy”, in which the CCP gathers voices from within and outside of the Party, “enabling people to exercise their right to be masters of the state”.

The conceptualisation of China as a democratic state rests on three pillars:

The CCP is democratic, hence China must be too: Under “democratic centralism”, major policy decisions are taken by central Party organs, but are discussed at all administrative levels in formalised “democratic life meetings”. Work regulations issued in 2020 define the “centre” even more clearly and prescribe Xi Jinping Thought as the baseline, thus restricting divergence from top-down ideological guidance.

Chinese citizens can vote: Articles 2 and 3 of China’s Constitution state that citizens exercise their power through the People’s Congresses (China’s legislative organs), which are created through democratic elections. Based on the Election Law, all citizens over 18 can directly vote for delegates up to the county and urban district levels and are eligible to stand in elections. However, candidates for People’s Congresses are generally preselected and the Constitution makes clear that the PRC is a socialist state under the sole leadership of the CCP.

The CCP considers other stakeholders and interests: Formally, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences serve as the main channel for consultative democracy. Under the label of multiparty cooperation with eight democratic bloc parties and gathering of public feedback (including online), the CCP does solicit opinions from various stakeholders, as long as they do not contest the CCP’s policy priorities.

The ideal of consensus-oriented, efficient democracy under centralised Party leadership is juxtaposed to the confrontational, erratic nature of Western democracy. Now presented as the only suitable system for China, it has not always gone uncontested. The 1989 student protests called for a reform of China’s political system, including elements of liberal democracy. In the aftermath of this movement, the term largely disappeared from political debates in China.

In 2002, the 16th Party Congress included the statement that “inner-party democracy is the life of the Party”. Leading Party thinkers brought the concept back into play. Though limited to a vision of democracy that is compatible with one party rule, in the late 2000s and early 2010s, officials, media and citizens publicly discussed strengthening inner-party democracy and liberalising local government elections to allow a pluralism of positions and include more non-party members. Independent candidates stood for election and had some success. In the 2011 local elections, pro-civil rights candidates attempted to enter the race under the motto “One person, one vote, together we change China”. After Xi rose to power in 2012, “democracy” was included as one of the 12 core socialist values. However, this did not mark a more liberal conceptualisation of democracy. Experiments in participation were shut down, and independent candidates were arrested. In 2013, Document No. 9 defined liberal democracy as a threat to regime stability. Concepts such as constitutional democracy, separation of powers and judicial independence are regularly dismissed as “incorrect ideological thinking” that must be met with resolute resistance. Liberal values were characterised as the root cause of sustained protests in Hong Kong in 2019, ushering in extensive legal and electoral reforms to ensure that only “patriots” supportive of government policy may run for office.

Development

Written by Marina Rudyak on .

Brief

In the context of DAC[1] donor countries, “development” is commonly understood as a multidimensional socio-economic process with political, economic, social, environmental and cultural dimensions. In this regard, the political dimension (in particular, democracy) is seen as essential to realising the others, which is why development cooperation emphasises good governance, respect for human rights and corruption prevention, often making respective efforts by recipients a condition for aid.

Chinese discourse views “development” primarily as a process of technology-centred “modernisation”. “Economic development” by means of investment in transport, energy and digital infrastructure construction, trade-related infrastructure, production capacities and innovative technology is thought to go hand-in-hand with “social development”. “Economic and social development” are seen as the necessary precondition for both improving the “people’s livelihood” – a term that refers to education, medical and health services, and public welfare facilities – and for “green development”, to be achieved through technological innovation. China criticises Western donor countries for making improvements in good governance, anti-corruption efforts and human rights a condition for development assistance, arguing that these aspects should not be put above development issues on the economic and technical level, such as infrastructure building or industrial and agricultural development.

Analysis

China rejects the conditionality approach and argues that donors should respect the developing countries’ “right to independently choose their development path” and focus on “strengthening the capacity for independent development”. As a process, development should be “self-reliant” (自力更生, literally translated as: “regeneration through one’s own efforts”) and “independent”.

The concept of development as technology-led modernisation can be traced back to Sun Yat-sen, since then, it has been perceived as a means to overcome the “underdevelopment” and “backwardness” that caused China to lose the Opium Wars. Following the Bandung Conference of 1955, China’s premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai argued that China considered economic independence to be a prerequisite for political independence. Therefore, while focusing on its own development, China would also provide assistance to other developing countries – implying that helping the latter in their economic development would foster their political independence from the US-led capitalist bloc.

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, who succeeded Mao Zedong as the paramount leader of the CCP, declared that China’s development required “Four Modernisations” – in agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology. Shortly afterwards, the human rights activist Wei Jingsheng wrote an essay displayed on the Democracy Wall in Beijing, calling on the CCP to add “democracy” as a “Fifth Modernisation”, for which he was arrested and later exiled to the US.

Under Xi Jinping, development has become linked to the “two centenary goals”: the centenary of the founding of the CCP in 2021, at which point China became a “moderately well-off society”; and the centenary of the founding of the PRC in 2049, at which point China should have achieved the “Chinese Dream” of national “rejuvenation” and reclaimed the central position it lost through the Opium Wars.

Since the times of Zhou Enlai, China’s policy of international development cooperation can be seen as an externalisation of its domestic development agenda. The language used to describe the objectives of China’s foreign aid – to “enrich and improve their peoples’ livelihood, and promote their economic growth and social progress” – is nearly identical with the language employed when talking about the development needed to overcome the “relative backwardness” of China’s Western and national minority regions. The “Chinese Dream” has been extended to a “World Dream” of “common development” (共同发展).

Yet, for a long time, China has maintained that its “foreign aid” (对外援助) to developing countries was not “development aid” (发展援助). The latter term was almost exclusively used to describe Western donors’ aid, including to China. This practice has changed under Xi Jinping: the “Right to Development” (发展权) White Paper states that China has been providing “development aid” for sixty years. The name of the aid agency CIDCA recently established in 2018 stands for “China International Development Cooperation Agency”, implying that China now sees itself as a development provider.  

[1] Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

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