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First Letter: R

a scientist holding a chinese flag

Responsible Research

Written by Marina Rudyak on .

Brief

The 2018 UNESCO Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers defines responsible research as a practice that upholds ethical, social, ecological, and scientific responsibility. It calls on researchers to minimise harm to human subjects and the environment, manage resources sustainably, and ensure informed consent and appropriate crediting of contributions. The document also emphasises the importance of academic freedom, open access to knowledge, and the protection of human rights as integral to responsible scientific conduct. Some countries have also discussed responsible research in terms of economic security, including the United States and Germany. 

China actively participates in international debates on responsible research, for example through the 2023 Guidelines for Responsible Research Conduct issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). However, its domestic discourse emphasises a distinct understanding. Responsible research in the Chinese context is closely tied to the notions of “research integrity” (科研诚信) and the fight against “research misconduct” (科研不端行为), with strong emphasis placed on disciplinary mechanisms and moral conduct. At the same time, responsibility is also framed in terms of scientists’ contribution to national development, modernisation, and technological self-reliance – positioning researchers as agents of state-led progress.

Analysis

The Chinese debate on responsible research emerged in the early 1990s in response to a series of plagiarism scandals. This led state-affiliated research institutions to issue codes of conduct, framing “scientific ethics” (科学道德) as key for both national progress and security. The Chinese Academy of Sciences’ (CAS) 2001 Code of Scientific Ethics, for instance, emphasised researchers’ obligation to support technological progress and safeguard national, information, ecological, environmental, and health security—with national security listed first. MOST’s 2006 Measures for Handling Scientific Research Misconduct framed research integrity as essential to achieving China’s strategic goals of independent innovation, economic and social development, national defence capabilities, and China’s rise as a global science and technology power.

From the early 2010s, the term “responsible science and research” (负责任(的)科学研究), along with variations of “responsible research and innovation” (负责任的研究与创新), began to enter the Chinese discourse, partly inspired by the European Union’s Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) policy. The National Science and Technology Plan of the 13th Five-Year-Plan (2016-2020) marked the first official mention, framing “responsible research and innovation” as a key to the “construction of socialist culture”. Although the Plan advocated critical thinking and academic debate and freedom, it also emphasised researchers’ duties: social responsibility (社会责任), serving the motherland (报效祖国) and embodying core socialist values and good morals. 

This framing was reinforced at the 2016 National Conference on Science and Technology Innovation, where Xi Jinping emphasised that researchers should not only pursue knowledge, but apply scientific and technological achievements to solve problems and realise the great cause of modernisation – “write your papers on the motherland!” The slogan has since been frequently repeated by Xi Jinping and widely cited in official and academic discourse.

Between 2018 and 2023, the CCP issued guidance further institutionalising this understanding. This includes: Scientific Research Integrity (2018), focusing on preventing fraud; on the Spirit of Scientists (2019), promoting patriotic research ethics; and, on the Governance of Science and Technology Ethics (2023), which introduced new review mechanisms in sensitive fields like artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology.

The Covid-19 pandemic reinforced the official discourse on state-led “responsible innovation”, with calls for policy-makers to define research priorities. Innovation, the argument goes, should be planned – not be left to the market or individual researchers – because it must serve public rather than individual interest. In the context of COVID-19, this meant that research was not primarily about understanding the virus, but about serving the people and advancing national goals.  

While MOST’s 2023 new Guidelines for Responsible Research Conduct draw on international practices and devoting an extensive part to regulating AI, they require institutional approval before publishing major breakthroughs and extend research oversight to enterprises. The guidelines have been updated several times but the initial message that responsible research serves self-reliance and China’s rise as global science superpower, prioritising national goals over academic freedom.

a man holding a stick and a carrot

Reciprocity

Written by Jerker Hellström on .

Brief

Reciprocity is a social norm and a key principle in international relations, diplomacy, trade, and law that can be summarised as responding in kind to actions by others. Its meaning, however, varies greatly depending on the context and can be categorised into two types: positive and negative. Positive reciprocity involves returning favours or beneficial actions, while negative reciprocity involves responding in kind to harm or detrimental actions.[1]

A common connotation of reciprocity is that of reciprocal justice – “an eye for an eye” or “tit for tat”. Western calls for reciprocity, often in relation to China, typically focus on achieving balanced and fair trade that adheres to international agreements, highlighting the notion of a “level playing field”. In contrast, Chinese rhetoric on reciprocity emphasises mutual benefit and ‘win-win’ outcomes (互惠互利), terms commonly found in Chinese official documents and statements.  

The Chinese leadership maintains that reciprocity should be “conditionalised”, taking disparities in economic development into account, as measured, for example, by GDP per capita. This means that China, in light of the country’s official status as a developing economy, should not be held to the same standards as developed economies.

Analysis

The concept of reciprocity is found in both western and Chinese ethical systems. In the West, it stems from the Christian instruction to treat others as you would want them to treat you. A negative variation (“do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you”) is attributed to Confucius in the Analects.

In modern-day Chinese official discourse, reciprocity is often intertwined with notions of mutual respect, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. Officials try to emphasise a collaborative and less confrontational approach to international relations by contrasting reciprocity with undesirable ideas of zero-sum thinking and a “cold war mentality”. Reciprocity, in this sense, is a cornerstone of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (1954), adopted in the 1960s by the Non-Aligned Movement. These principles underscore mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, reflecting a vision where global cooperation trumps unilateral gain.

When engaging with partners in the Global South, China often emphasises reciprocity as part of a narrative of mutual respect and common development. China portrays itself as an altruistic provider of global public goods, contrasting this with the perceived selfish interests of Western powers. This narrative is reinforced by China’s diplomatic efforts, which highlight positive reciprocity, such as infrastructure investments in exchange for natural resources, or mutual support for domestic political issues. In developing economies that the Party-state considers friendly, it mostly refrains from retaliatory measures, prioritising potential geopolitical wins over economic interests.

Conversely, China’s relationship with liberal democracies, particularly the United States and the European Union, is often characterised by negative connotations of reciprocity. Beijing frequently criticises Western pressure on China to open its economy, arguing that stronger Western powers demand reciprocal actions from less developed economies without offering equivalent concessions.

In the context of trade relations, reciprocity is a contentious issue between China and the European Union. The EU advocates for strict reciprocity in market access and regulatory treatment, but China maintains that its status as a developing economy should be considered, arguing for conditional reciprocity. This fundamental disconnect was highlighted in 2019 when the European Commission ceased to consider China a developing country, denying Beijing’s requests for special treatment.

Regarding climate change, China also invokes a form of reciprocity that it calls “common but differentiated responsibilities”. This is a form of reciprocity where developed countries are expected to take the lead in reducing emissions, due to their historical contributions to the problem.

Reciprocity also plays a role in retaliatory measures. China explicitly invokes the principle of reciprocity when responding to actions perceived as hostile, such as the closure of diplomatic missions or the imposition of sanctions. However, China often does not acknowledge the reciprocal nature of its actions in diplomacy or trade, whether it involves detaining foreign nationals or imposing restrictions on foreign goods.

The term “win-win” is a prominent feature of Chinese diplomatic language, emphasising the avoidance of sensitive issues in bilateral interactions through “seeking common ground while putting aside differences”. This approach is contrasted with the European perspective, where reciprocity is less about avoiding controversy and more about achieving balanced cooperation.

[1] A. Whelan, Reciprocity in Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).

hands and stars

Responsible

Written by Editors on .

The Party argues that it has a historic responsibility to “serve the people” and derives its legitimacy from delivering tangible benefits. The CCP presents itself as the only organisation capable of guiding China’s economic and technological rise while ensuring the creation of a “moderately prosperous society” and safeguarding social stability (which is often contrasted with the purported political turmoil of other nations).

On the global stage, China has responded to regular appeals by Western states to be a “responsible global stakeholder” by positioning itself as a responsible major power (负责任大国) that delivers concrete benefits and contributes to global public goods in areas such as economic growth, health, and climate. It highlights its constructive engagement in the United Nations, by engaging in peacekeeping and regularly paying its UN dues.  China’s initiatives—such as the BRI and its growing list of global initiatives on development, security and other areas— are presented as key pillars of the international order.

This narrative presents China as a peaceful, non-hegemonic, and solution-oriented alternative to Western countries, that is inclusive of developing nations– even as it shows a high willingness to exert high pressure when China’s political and economic interests are at stake.

Rational

Written by Editors on .

Domestically, China’s government uses the term “rational” to legitimise policy decisions as scientific, modern and the most appropriate choice to address a given policy issue, whereas contestation is often described as irrational, misguided or instigated by a small minority of trouble-makers or external instigators.

In international relations, “rational” often appears alongside “pragmatic” and “constructive,” conveying the message that counterparts should focus on shared benefits and constructive cooperation. For European governments, this term carries an expectation to prioritize economic interests and independence from the U.S as part of “true strategic autonomy”. This requires setting aside disagreements on issues ranging from human rights and China’s stance on Ukraine to overcapacity and technology related security-concerns.

Towards Global South countries, China calls for working together for a fair, equal and rational international order, that reflects the rising weight of emerging economies. At the same time, they are asked to refrain from siding with the US. The underlying message to all: opposing China is not rational, given its political clout and the economic benefits it offers.

Right to Privacy

Written by Katja Drinhausen on .

Brief

At its core, the right to privacy refers to freedom from undue interference in personal life, home and correspondence. UN and EU standards make clear that the right to privacy entails freedom from arbitrary and mass surveillance. Safeguarding privacy has become a challenging issue in the digital age, as both states and corporations collect and analyse significant amounts of data. Privacy is therefore closely intertwined with the protection of personal data, for which e.g., GDPR, and national laws create new frameworks.

Articles 39 and 40 of the PRC Constitution similarly forbid the unlawful search and intrusion of the homes and correspondence of Chinese citizens. China’s legal protection of personal data has been substantially expanded in recent years. Where discourse and legislation in liberal democracies has traditionally emphasised protection from the state, the focus in China is predominantly on protecting citizens from excessive collection and abuse of data by corporate actors. The state retains expansive rights to monitor and request data about its citizens under broadly defined public and national security prerogatives.

Analysis

China’s new Civil Code (2021) and Personal Information Protection Law (2021) have strengthened the protection of personal rights and information in China. Companies or organisations that handle personal information now face stricter obligations to gain consent and inform individuals about the data they collect and how it may be processed.

Although privacy and security of personal data were highlighted in the 2021 White Paper on Human Rights Progress by the State Council, the acknowledgement of a right to privacy as a distinct individual right is largely absent from official documents. This has both political and linguistic roots. Under Mao’s collectivist regime, keeping things private was a matter of suspicion. The wider adoption of the term was also hampered by the fact that the Chinese term for privacy (隐私) is homonymous with the term for “shameful secret” (阴私).

The political and public approach changed in the era of reform and opening. In the 1990s and early 2000s, China’s government formulated the first data protection regulations. The following decades saw not only a growing protection of privacy rights through personal information and data security standards, but also an increasing use of the term in academic writing and public debates.

Today, privacy is a well-established term in China. This is closely linked to the widespread adaptation of digital technologies in daily life – from communication and travel to consumption and payment. In contrast to European norms, Chinese policy documents and legislation frame privacy and the protection of personal information primarily under information security and consumer rights and are largely directed at the private sector, not protection from state-led efforts to surveil the population.

State organs must comply with established standards in their collection and use of data. But China’s National Security Law, Cybersecurity Law and other legislation give the state wide remit to monitor public and online spaces. Corporate privacy statements generally include references that data can be shared with relevant agencies where it concerns public and national security. As platforms are legally required to provide online services only after real-name registration and identity verification, data can quickly be tied to individuals.

To build a peaceful China (平安中国), government policies since 2012 aim at expanding camera coverage, tracking physical movements and monitoring online expression to build a preventive, “multi-dimensional” system for safeguarding public security (立体化信息化社会治安防控体系) – and the political security of the Party State. Complementing previous surveillance initiatives that are now a core component of “smart” and “safe cities”, recent years have also seen a digital upgrading of mechanisms already established under Mao. This includes digitisation of personal files on citizens as well as the use of apps and hotlines to encourage mutual monitoring and reporting among the population. Progress in surveillance capacities has been on display in pandemic management, but also in minority areas such as Xinjiang.[1]

Government efforts to use data for public and national security purposes are by no means exclusive to China. What sets the implementation of privacy in the PRC apart is the lack of institutional and public oversight through administrative and constitutional review procedures, a free press and civil rights organisations. This approach to privacy is not uncontested. From public and academic discussions to individual lawsuits and refusal of companies to hand-over data – China’s citizens are concerned about the protection of their privacy. Leaks of public databases and the abuse of China’s health code apps to prevent protests sparked renewed debates in 2022.

[1] For a detailed analysis of China’s state surveillance and its practical implications see: J. Chin and L. Lin, Surveillance State: Inside China’s Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control, MacMillan, 2022.

a pagoda-shaped scale

Rule of Law

Written by Malin Oud on .

Brief

The principle of the rule of law means that laws provide meaningful restraints on state power. The United Nations defines the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards”. In a rule of law system, every person is subject to the law and no one is above it. In liberal democracies, the rule of law is associated with civil and political rights and implies a separation of powers.

The Chinese Communist Party’s conception of the rule of law – fazhi (法治) or yifazhiguo (依法治国),which literally means “law-based governance” or ruling the country in accordance with the law – has very little in common with the liberal democratic concept. In China’s “socialist rule of law system with Chinese characteristics” the legal system is under the Party’s leadership and supervision. The CCP ultimately sees the law as a tool to ensure stability and order, as well as being a means to justify and maintain Party rule. Arguably, fazhi is so different from the international principle of rule of law that it should perhaps not be translated as “rule of law”.

Analysis

The rule of law has been a recurring theme in China’s reform plans and official discourse ever since the early 1980s. The reconstruction of the legal system and the professionalisation of the judiciary were important aspects of China’s modernisation reforms in the aftermath of the political campaigns of Mao Zedong, which culminated in the Cultural Revolution.

After Mao’s death, measures were put in place to prevent the over-concentration of power and to delegate authority from the Communist Party to government agencies. Key words like class struggle, contradictions and revolution were replaced with stability, harmony and the rule of law. Legal institutions were created, entire new areas of legislation drafted, law schools established. As the country opened itself up to foreign investment and international cooperation, there was an assumption in the West that China would also be socialised into accepting international norms and that it was evolving from ‘rule by man’ under Mao Zedong to the rule of law in a liberal democratic sense.

Xi Jinping has stressed the importance of the rule of law since he rose to power in 2012 and pledged to catch both “tigers and flies” in a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign. The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Congress of the CCP in 2014 had the rule of law as its overall theme, which it declared would provide “a powerful guarantee for achieving the Two Centenary Goals and realising the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.

However, if the first thirty years of legal reform and opening up saw the de-politicisation of the Chinese justice system, the last decade has seen its re-politicisation or partyfication. Party organs have absorbed their government counterparts, and the law has been used to codify the Party’s leadership. In 2018, a constitutional amendment removed the term limits for the presidency introduced in 1982. A series of vague but sweeping security laws and regulations have been enacted, including most recently in Hong Kong. Illustrative of China’s instrumental use of law and selective compliance with international law, in June 2020 Beijing passed the Hong Kong National Security Law, bypassing Hong Kong’s local legislature and the “One Country Two Systems’” principle of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. 

In November 2020, the CCP held a conference declaring the establishment of “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law and its status as the guiding thought for law-based governance in China”. Stressing the importance of upholding the leadership of the CCP in order to build China into a socialist country under the rule of law by the year 2035, the whole country was instructed to seriously study and understand Xi Jinping’s Thought on the Rule of Law (习近平法治思想) as “one of the pivotal pillars of the ideological complex that supports the country in the years to come”.

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