Skip to main content

Author: David Bandurski

David Bandurski is a founding member and contributor at The Decoding China Project. His work focuses on media, public diplomacy and civil society. He is also Executive Director of the China Media Project, an independent research organisation based in Taiwan that specialises in the study of Chinese-language media and the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) both within the PRC and globally. His books include Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin/MelvilleHouse), a work of reportage on urban development in China, and Investigative Journalism in China.

Recalling the Pandas

On January 28, twin giant pandas Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei touched down at Chengdu Tianfu International Airport, returned from Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo after Beijing announced it was recalling them — leaving Japan without a Chinese panda for the first time in decades. The departure was a visible symbol of a diplomatic crisis that has pushed Sino-Japanese relations to their lowest point in years.

The diplomatic fallout traces back to November last year, when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — reelected this month with a historically strong mandate — became the first sitting Japanese prime minister to publicly state that an attack on Taiwan would justify Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense. For China’s leadership, Taiwan’s status is a question of sovereignty on which any outside comment is regarded as “interference.” Responding to Takaichi’s remarks, China lodged a complaint with the United Nations, postponed a trilateral summit with South Korea, restricted rare earth exports, cancelled flight routes, warned Chinese tourists and students away from Japan — and, of course, recalled its pandas.

The Chinese government’s response to Takaichi’s remarks has operated on two distinct registers simultaneously, centering on the CCP’s particular application of “friendship” and “culture.” In covering Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei’s return, CCTV described the pandas’ parents as “envoys of Sino-Japanese friendly exchange” (中日友好交流使者) and credited the twins with having “continuously built a bridge of friendly people-to-people relations” and made “positive contributions to increasing friendship between the peoples of the two countries.” The coercive context — a classic example of Panda diplomacy — went unmentioned. China Daily‘s Tokyo correspondent meanwhile framed the pandas’ absence as an opportunity: Japanese fans were encouraged to visit China under its visa-free policy and “experience its rich natural ecology and cultural charm firsthand.”

That warmth was nowhere evident when Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the Munich Security Conference last week, invoking Japan’s wartime history and warning that “if Japan doesn’t truly repent for its wrongdoing, history will only repeat itself.” Japan’s foreign ministry formally protested the remarks, calling them “factually incorrect and ungrounded.” Two days later, a spokesperson from China’s embassy in Tokyo dismissed Japan’s protest using a familiar qualifier: “Japan’s so-called protest distorts the facts, turns black and white upside down, and is pure sophistry,” the spokesperson said.

“Friendship” and “Culture” in Southeast Asia

As the Mid-Autumn Festival approached for much of Asia in late September, the propaganda office of the Chinese Communist Party leadership in the southwestern province of Yunnan applied the frames of culture and friendship to promote bilateral relations with key Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia and Vietnam. The office co-organized nearly identical Mid-Autumn Festival galas in Hanoi and Phnom Penh on September 25 and 28 respectively, both called “Colorful Clouds Chasing the Moon: Deep Neighborly Affection.” The parallel events revealed how “friendship” (友谊) functions as an organizing principle for China’s foreign policy, and how culture (文化) serves as a vehicle for related messaging.

In Hanoi on September 25, Yunnan propaganda official Cai Xiangrong described China and Vietnam as “friendly neighbors” (友好邻邦) connected by mountains and rivers, emphasizing both geographic and cultural continuities. Vietnamese officials echoed this language, with one stating that cultural similarities “illuminate the broad path of cooperation.” Meanwhile, Chinese state media coverage framed plans for media collaboration between the countries as furthering “cultural integration and mutual understanding between peoples” (促进文化相融、民心相通).Three days later in Phnom Penh, the performances for the Cambodia gala were organized by the Yunnan propaganda office around the theme of “China-Cambodia Friendship” (中柬友谊), and the event featured a historical drama based on the Yuan dynasty envoy Zhou Daguan, who visited the court of Angkor in the 13th century — and is often cited in Chinese accounts as exemplifying early “friendly” relations with Southeast Asia. In language emphasizing emotional ties, Chinese state media described one Cambodian official as saying that “the full moon reflects the long-standing friendship and enduring affection between Cambodia and China.”

Download the full dictionary here.

(ENGLISH DIGITAL VERSION)