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Author: David Bandurski

David Bandurski is a founding member and contributor at The Decoding China Project. His work focuses on media, public diplomacy and civil society. He is also Executive Director of the China Media Project, an independent research organisation based in Taiwan that specialises in the study of Chinese-language media and the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) both within the PRC and globally. His books include Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin/MelvilleHouse), a work of reportage on urban development in China, and Investigative Journalism in China.

June Fourth and the Right to Development

This past week marked the 37th anniversary of the brutal suppression of a peaceful protest movement on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in which people from all walks of life, many of them young students, were killed because they advocated for political reform and an end to corruption. The protests that unfolded across the country in the spring of 1989 were an insistent cry for fundamental human rights and democracy, hopes that were met with tanks and bullets. Nearly four decades later, the date is unmentionable inside China, and the world’s most sophisticated system of media and internet censorship ensures that commemoration is virtually impossible.

But an important part of the erasure of this anniversary is achieved also today by the leadership’s amplification of an alternate vision of human rights, one centered on the idea that “development” is the foremost human right. On its front page, just under the masthead, the official People’s Daily mentions “development” 20 times in a single tribute to Xi Jinping’s “heartfelt concern for the people” (人民情怀), a Party formula that in this instance means measuring the leader’s bond with ordinary citizens through the provision of goods, including healthcare, education and economic well-being, over political participation and civil rights. The headline goes further in declaring the Party’s development vision as a vision for the whole world: “China Can Succeed, and So Can Other Developing Countries,” it reads.

In this iconic image, a young Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), later a prominent human rights lawyer, wears a poster on Tiananmen Square in 1989 with the words “freedom of the press” and “freedom of association.” SOURCE: Open Book.

The phrase “not leaving a single person behind” (不让一个人掉队) echoes theUnited Nations Sustainable Development Goals’ core pledge to “leave no one behind.” But the understanding of how this is to be achieved differs markedly from the SDG vision of civic participation in development,conveyed in SDG 16, which recognizes “the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect for human rights, on effective rule of law and good governance at all levels.” People’s Daily speaks of “people-centered development” (以人民为中心的发展), a common trope according to which it is the Party, not the public or the individual, that determines what the people need. Xi is quoted as declaring that “the aspiration of all peoples for a better life is our pursuit.” This follows a persistent CCP position that “a prosperous people’s life,” understood in material terms, is the highest form of human rights. “Subsistence is the foundation of all human rights; a prosperous people’s life is the greatest human right,” Xi has often been quoted as saying in a May 2022 People’s Daily series devoted to the subject.

This development-centered view of human rights dates back to the aftermath of June Fourth. China published its first White Paper on Human Rights in 1991, issued in direct response to international criticism of the Tiananmen crackdown. The paper began by relativizing the concept as set out in the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and asserting the notion of “Chinese human rights” conditioned on the country’s unique characteristics: “Owing to tremendous differences in historical background, social system, cultural tradition and economic development, countries differ in their understanding and practice of human rights,” it read. 

China’s state-centric, relativist conception of human rights systematically excludes civil and political rights, prioritizing instead “the right to subsistence” and the right to development — elevating economic growth and stability above individual freedoms. Beijing has carried this framework into the international arena by inserting concepts like “a community of shared future” into UN Human Rights Council resolutions and sponsoring resolutions that recast human rights as a matter of state-to-state cooperation rather than individual accountability, effectively working to reshape global human rights governance in its own image.

Recalling the Pandas

On January 28, twin giant pandas Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei touched down at Chengdu Tianfu International Airport, returned from Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo after Beijing announced it was recalling them — leaving Japan without a Chinese panda for the first time in decades. The departure was a visible symbol of a diplomatic crisis that has pushed Sino-Japanese relations to their lowest point in years.

The diplomatic fallout traces back to November last year, when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — reelected this month with a historically strong mandate — became the first sitting Japanese prime minister to publicly state that an attack on Taiwan would justify Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense. For China’s leadership, Taiwan’s status is a question of sovereignty on which any outside comment is regarded as “interference.” Responding to Takaichi’s remarks, China lodged a complaint with the United Nations, postponed a trilateral summit with South Korea, restricted rare earth exports, cancelled flight routes, warned Chinese tourists and students away from Japan — and, of course, recalled its pandas.

The Chinese government’s response to Takaichi’s remarks has operated on two distinct registers simultaneously, centering on the CCP’s particular application of “friendship” and “culture.” In covering Xiao Xiao and Lei Lei’s return, CCTV described the pandas’ parents as “envoys of Sino-Japanese friendly exchange” (中日友好交流使者) and credited the twins with having “continuously built a bridge of friendly people-to-people relations” and made “positive contributions to increasing friendship between the peoples of the two countries.” The coercive context — a classic example of Panda diplomacy — went unmentioned. China Daily‘s Tokyo correspondent meanwhile framed the pandas’ absence as an opportunity: Japanese fans were encouraged to visit China under its visa-free policy and “experience its rich natural ecology and cultural charm firsthand.”

That warmth was nowhere evident when Foreign Minister Wang Yi addressed the Munich Security Conference last week, invoking Japan’s wartime history and warning that “if Japan doesn’t truly repent for its wrongdoing, history will only repeat itself.” Japan’s foreign ministry formally protested the remarks, calling them “factually incorrect and ungrounded.” Two days later, a spokesperson from China’s embassy in Tokyo dismissed Japan’s protest using a familiar qualifier: “Japan’s so-called protest distorts the facts, turns black and white upside down, and is pure sophistry,” the spokesperson said.

“Friendship” and “Culture” in Southeast Asia

As the Mid-Autumn Festival approached for much of Asia in late September, the propaganda office of the Chinese Communist Party leadership in the southwestern province of Yunnan applied the frames of culture and friendship to promote bilateral relations with key Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia and Vietnam. The office co-organized nearly identical Mid-Autumn Festival galas in Hanoi and Phnom Penh on September 25 and 28 respectively, both called “Colorful Clouds Chasing the Moon: Deep Neighborly Affection.” The parallel events revealed how “friendship” (友谊) functions as an organizing principle for China’s foreign policy, and how culture (文化) serves as a vehicle for related messaging.

In Hanoi on September 25, Yunnan propaganda official Cai Xiangrong described China and Vietnam as “friendly neighbors” (友好邻邦) connected by mountains and rivers, emphasizing both geographic and cultural continuities. Vietnamese officials echoed this language, with one stating that cultural similarities “illuminate the broad path of cooperation.” Meanwhile, Chinese state media coverage framed plans for media collaboration between the countries as furthering “cultural integration and mutual understanding between peoples” (促进文化相融、民心相通).Three days later in Phnom Penh, the performances for the Cambodia gala were organized by the Yunnan propaganda office around the theme of “China-Cambodia Friendship” (中柬友谊), and the event featured a historical drama based on the Yuan dynasty envoy Zhou Daguan, who visited the court of Angkor in the 13th century — and is often cited in Chinese accounts as exemplifying early “friendly” relations with Southeast Asia. In language emphasizing emotional ties, Chinese state media described one Cambodian official as saying that “the full moon reflects the long-standing friendship and enduring affection between Cambodia and China.”

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