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International Relations

Written by Marina Rudyak on .

Brief

In mainstream usage, “international relations” refers to the study and practice of political, economic, and security interactions among states and other global actors, including international organisations, corporations, and non-state groups. The UN Charter codifies key principles such as the sovereign equality of states, prohibition of force and commitment to peaceful dispute resolution, non-intervention, and respect for human rights.

In Chinese official discourse, “international relations” (国际关系) denotes not merely to the study or practice of relations, but a normative vision of how relations ought to be conducted. A “new type of international relations” (新型国际关系), characterised by mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win cooperation” is a core concept within Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. Framing itself as defender of the UN Charter, China calls for a “democratisation of international relations” (国际关系民主化), in opposition to what it depicts as Western interventionism undermining the sovereignty and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries under the banner of democracy and human rights.

Analysis

China’s “basic norms of international relations” (国际关系的基本准则) are officially rooted in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Originally formulated in 1954, they were promoted during the Mao era as the foundation of modern international relations, countering what China saw as US-led “hegemonism” and “power politics”. From the outset, these principles served to defend China’s core interests: support for Taiwan independence or criticism over Tibet policy were framed as violating the basic norms of international relations, specifically the principle of non-interference.

The “new type of international relations” initially referred to ties within the socialist camp, especially with the USSR, defined by Leninist “proletarian internationalism” – promoted by China as a model relationship until the 1963 Sino-Soviet split reframed the USSR as a violator of international norms.

From the 1970s onward, China borrowed the Non-Aligned Movement’s rhetoric on the democratisation of international relations, linking sovereignty and opposition to “big power hegemonism” of the US and USSR with advocacy for greater agency for the Third World in global governance. The principle of “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity” was regularly invoked to condemn U.S. interventions, such as in Libya and Iraq, and to oppose humanitarian interventions more broadly. In the 2000s, Hu Jintao elevated “jointly advancing the democratisation of international relations“ to a flagship slogan, but his state-centric reading equated democracy with equality among states rather than democracy within states.

This historical trajectory laid the groundwork for how under Xi Jinping, the CCP’s use of international relations embeds a dual counternarrative. First, a normative claim: China presents itself as a defender of basic norms – such as the Five Principles and the UN Charter – against what it labels as Western selective application, unilateral sanctions, and interventionism. Second, a strategic positioning: democratisation of international relations implies redistributing power toward developing countries and emerging powers without embracing liberal-democratic norms. This vision is explicitly state-centric, defining “interventionism” broadly to include external criticism, which is framed as a violation of sovereignty.

Though guoji guanxi is the standard Chinese term for international relations, guanxi – its second component – carries a culturally specific meaning that goes beyond neutral “relations”. Originating from Confucian thought, guanxi denotes a form of social capital embedded in reciprocal personal ties, where ongoing exchanges of favours generate durable networks of obligation, trust, and mutual recognition. Applied to the global sphere, international relations are fundamentally understood as human relations, with guanxi – the ability to manage them – constituting a key source of power.[1] Accordingly, ceremonial banquets and summit diplomacy – used to give face, reinforce status recognition, and create a network of reciprocal obligations – occupy a central place in China’s foreign policy.

The Chinese government expects international relations scholarship to serve national rejuvenation by producing theories with “Chinese characteristics” that embody China’s values, perspectives, and historical experience. It envisions the discipline as a tool to enhance China’s voice in global governance, promote its preferred norms, and support a multipolar, sovereignty-cantered international order. Under Xi, research funding has increasingly focused on his ideological concepts, with area studies elevated to a first-tier discipline, fostering scholarship with state priorities.

[1] Qin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2018.

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Innovation

Written by Katja Drinhausen on .

Brief

Innovation means the creation and adoption of new ideas, approaches or products. The UN views scientific and technological innovation as key for economic growth and sustainable development, offering potential solutions for global challenges such as inequality, food security, or climate adaptation. The UN also highlights the benefits of “social innovation” by improving governance and empowering civil society. In comparison, national innovation agendas often place a stronger emphasis on economic competitiveness and military strength.

Innovation is central to the CCP’s vision of modernising its economy and managing society. Decades of policy plans, investment, and private sector competition have made China a global innovation leader, technology exporter, and standard-setter. The state directs resources to applied innovation in emerging technologies and strategic sectors, including military and security applications. Indigenous innovation (自主创新) is gaining importance as the country strives to decrease dependencies and cement its position as a science and technology power.

Analysis

Under Xi Jinping, innovation has become one of the most prominent terms in the CCP’s vocabulary. It is seen as crucial for China’s modernisation and shift towards a new development model focused on digitisation, automation and cutting-edge industries. Party documents and media regularly highlight the need to lead the next industrial revolution. This push is fuelled by fierce technological competition with the US and increasing restrictions of high-tech exports to China, especially on advanced chips and chip-making equipment.

The concept of innovation has been part of CCP discourse since the 1940s, historically tied to self-reliance and renewal. In the 1950s and ’60s, it signified progress in science and production. From the early reform period in the 1980s and 1990s, China’s industrial policy aimed to catch up with developed economies, shifting from production efficiency to advances in electronic goods and information technology. In the 1990s and 2000s, economic policy and regulations required foreign investors to transfer technology to help build China’s own innovation capacity. Research centres and companies were encouraged to “transfer, digest, absorb, and re-innovate” foreign technologies.

Xi has promised to move Chinese industries to the high-end of the global value chain. The 2015 “Made in China 2025” plan aimed to make the PRC a global leader in key manufacturing sectors. Since 2020, the ambition has shifted to leading technological breakthroughs. The government provides national research grants, state guidance funds and other incentives to promote research and development in emerging technologies and strategic sectors such as green tech, biotech, quantum computing, AI, and new telecommunication standards. The military-civil fusion policy and the use of technology in public security and surveillance are also major drivers of technological innovation.

China has defied assumptions about the importance of a liberal political environment for innovation. In 2024, it ranked 11th out of 133 economies on the Global Innovation Index and is a leader in new patent registrations. China’s private sector has a multitude of companies pursuing innovation – often in fierce competition. From Huawei to TikTok, Temu, and DeepSeek, Chinese technology companies have become globally renowned champions. A regulatory crackdown in the early 2020s has ensured that private sector efforts largely align with national strategic goals. Innovation will remain central in the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), with an emphasis on foundational research and talent development to boost indigenous innovation. 

Universities, enterprises and investors across the world are now keen to partake in China’s technological advances. The government shares benefits while protecting China’s edge. The PRC frames its technology exports as a global public good and strives to promote the Belt and Road Initiative as a “road of innovation,” alongside a host of bilateral projects. China is also active in various UN initiatives, often focusing on the green transition such as in the SDGs Innovation Lab in Suzhou. The leadership in innovation gives China a powerful voice in the contested space of setting international standards for telecommunications, internet and AI governance.

Innovation also features frequently in the Party’s discourse on governance. From Mao to Xi, leaders are credited with adapting Marxist ideology and political practices to China’s conditions and changing times. Xi has tasked the Party with “innovating social governance” to ensure stability and prosperity. This notion of social innovation entails using new digital tools for both public service provision and political control, making such efforts a part of official research and innovation agendas.

International law

Written by Malin Oud on .

Brief

International law is the body of rules and principles regulating the relations between states and other international actors. Based on treaties and customary law, it is an evolving concept that can be traced back some four hundred years. Fundamentally, international law requires respect for the sovereign equality of states, which means that states generally have the discretion to accept or reject proposed new international law. Since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, international law has expanded to prohibit the use of force against another state and to encompass human rights, humanitarian law, and accountability for international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as to address emerging concerns like space law, internet regulation, and environmental law.

In China’s understanding, the core principles of international law are state sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference. China views the liberal, post-World War II model of international law that has been dominant since the 1990s as a tool of Western hegemony and interventionism. Since 2015, China has put forward the concept of “a community with a shared future for mankind” (人类命运共同体) on the international stage, emphasising “common” rather than universal values. This is presented as a more inclusive, democratic, and fair model than the current international system. 

Analysis

The PRC took its seat as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” in 1971. Before the reform and opening policy launched in 1978, China was largely an outsider to the international law system. With the end of the Cultural Revolution, China abandoned the ideological struggle against the capitalist West that had marked the Mao era, and instead became an active participant in key international organisations and frameworks. It ratified core treaties on trade and investment, as well as some human rights treaties. China’s approach to international law has been instrumental and selective, leveraging rules that are advantageous to its development and eschewing rules that could bring disadvantages. Prominent examples are China’s insistence on its status as a “developing country” in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its unilateral claims regarding the South China Sea. 

China does not seek to replace the established UN-centred international system, but to reshape those parts of international law that conflict with its national interests. Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s first speech at the UN in 1974, China has cultivated an image of a peaceful developing country and responsible great power with no hegemonic intentions, which it contrasts with Western imperialism and the West’s historically self-serving role in creating international rules. From its own perspective, China is the real guardian of international law. For example, the leadership argues that it was “not violating but upholding the authority and dignity of international law” by not recognising the 2016 international arbitration ruling on conflicting territorial claims between the PRC and the Philippines in the South China Sea. UN investigations of the human rights situation in Hong Kong and Xinjiang are routinely discarded as “interference in China’s internal affairs” and “smear campaigns” orchestrated by the West.

In the last decade under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has evolved from rule-taker to aspiring rule-maker at the UN. Spurred by an increasing concern with security and stability in the face of uncertain global economic trends and democratic uprisings in other parts of the world, Party-state discourse now clearly promotes a Chinese model of governance. This model combines commitment to economic globalisation with the reaffirmation of a strong state not bound by liberal democratic checks. Xi’s vision of international order emphasises state sovereignty, non-interference and “win-win cooperation” theoretically based on “common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom”. In essence, China seeks to return to a pre-World War II understanding of international law where human rights are an internal matter of states.

As China’s economic and political clout grows, so does its ambition to expand the reach of its domestic laws and seek jurisdiction abroad. For example, the 2003 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Convention on Countering Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism has been used to quell “security threats” in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and to extradite suspects and dissidents at China’s behest. In this light, Xi’s project to construct  “foreign related rule of law” (涉外法治) and a “legal system applicable outside the jurisdiction of our country” has important implications for the future of international law.

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